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Majority and Dissent in Intel: Approaches
to Limiting International Judicial
Assistance
By E. MORGAN BOEING*
Introduction
Under federal law, when there is a proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal, an interested person may obtain access to
evidence located in the United States for use in that proceeding. In
the 1980s, a split emerged among the circuit courts regarding the
interpretation of the rule governing this type of discovery. Some
courts held that for a district court judge to grant the discovery, the
evidence sought would have to be obtainable under the foreign
jurisdiction's law if it were located in the foreign jurisdiction. Other
courts, seeing no such requirement in the federal statute, refused to
read one into it.
The Supreme Court resolved the split in 2004 in Intel v.
Advanced Micro Devices,1 coming out in support of the latter
position. The Court held that the statute in question contained no
foreign discoverability requirement, but that a district court judge's
discretion in granting discovery is not unlimited; just because a judge
is authorized to grant discovery does not mean that she should. The
Court enumerated a four-factor balancing test for a judge to use in
deciding whether to exercise her discretion. Only Justice Breyer
dissented. Rather than endorse the foreign discoverability
requirement as previously formulated in the circuit courts, he took
the position that discovery should be disallowed in two situations:
where the foreign body insists that it is not a tribunal and where
discovery would be unavailable both under foreign law and in
analogous domestic litigation. He also stated that the Court should
use its supervisory powers to promulgate rules thus limiting the
J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2006.
1. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 124 S. Ct. 2466 (2004).
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statute.
This Note proposes that the Supreme Court should indeed use its
supervisory powers to limit the statute at some point in the future.
However, before it does so, district courts need an opportunity to
apply current law to a broader variety of factual situations so that the
Court will have a greater wealth of examples from which to draw in
formulating such a rule. The majority's approach in Intel, though
flawed, is more suited to that process than Justice Breyer's would
have been had it become the law.
Background
International judicial assistance is the process whereby the courts
of one nation provide assistance in the collection of materials for use
by tribunals of other nations. In the United States, international
judicial assistance is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (Section
1782(a)), which authorizes federal district courts to grant discovery to
"interested person[s]" for use "in a proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal." 2 Under the statute, an interested party to a
proceeding before an international or foreign tribunal may request,
and be granted, discovery of evidence located in the district where the
2. The current statute reads in its entirety:
Assistance to foreign and international tribunals and to litigants before such
tribunals
(a) The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may
order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or
other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal,
including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation. The
order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by
a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of any interested
person and may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or the
document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the
court. By virtue of his appointment, the person appointed has power to
administer any necessary oath and take the testimony or statement. The
order may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be in whole or
part the practice and procedure of the foreign country or the international
tribunal, for taking the testimony or statement or producing the document
or other thing. To the extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the
testimony or statement shall be taken, and the document or other thing
produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to
produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable
privilege.
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2005).
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court sits. Section 1782(a)'s primary predecessor3 was enacted in
1948' to enable federal courts to meet an increasing number of
foreign discovery requests Originally limited to evidence sought
from United States residents for use in foreign civil actions, it was
amended to expand its scope in 1949.6 In 1964, Congress again
amended the statute,' enacting without revision the recommendations
of a commission it had created in 19588 to study further
3. An earlier statute was passed in 1855, authorizing circuit courts to designate
commissioners for the compelling of testimony by witnesses mentioned in letters
rogatory from foreign courts. Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630 (1855).
Due to an indexing error (it was indexed under the heading "Mistrials"), the statutes
fell into disuse. See Harry L. Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural
Chaos and a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 540 (1953).
A second statute was passed in 1863, permitting federal courts, in response to letters
rogatory, to compel testimony from a witness located in the United States for use in a
foreign jurisdiction. More restrictive than the 1855 statute, it required that the
foreign suit be for the recovery of money or property, that the suit be in a country at
peace with the United States, and that government of the country be a party or have
an interest in the suit. The Act stated in pertinent part:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, that the testimony of any witness
residing within the United States, to be used in any suit for the recovery of
money or property depending in any court in any foreign country with which
the United States are at peace, and in which the government of such country
shall be a party or shall have interest, may be obtained, to be used in such
suit.
Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 95, § 1-4, 12 Stat. 769 (1863).
4. Allowing district courts to compel witness depositions for use in civil cases
pending in countries with which the United States was at peace, the statute provided
in pertinent part:
[T]he deposition of any witness residing within the United States to be used
in any civil action pending in any court in a foreign country with which the
United States is at peace may be taken before a person ... designated by the
district court of any district where the witness resides or may be found.
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1782, 62 Stat. 949 (1948).
5. See Jones, supra note 3, at 558.
6. The modifications read, in pertinent part: "Section 1782 of title 28, United
States Code, is amended by striking out 'residing', which appears as the sixth word in
the first paragraph, and by striking out from the same paragraph the words 'civil
action' and in lieu thereof inserting 'judicial proceeding."' Act of May 24, 1949, ch.
139, § 93, 63 Stat. 103 (1949).
7. The amendment read: "The analysis of chapter 117 of title 28, United States
Code, is amended by striking: "1782. Testimony for use in foreign countries." And
inserting in place thereof: "1782. Assistance to foreign and international tribunals
and to litigants before such tribunals." Act of October 3, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-619, §
9, 78 Stat. 995(1964).
8. Congress tasked the Commission with the following:
The Commission shall investigate and study existing practices of judicial
assistance and cooperation between the United States and foreign countries
2006]
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improvements.9 The 1964 amendments overhauled and further
expanded Section 1782(a)'s ambit, largely creating the statute in the
form that exists today."0 The 1964 amendments were intended to
advance what have since been described as the "twin aims" of the
statute: first to clarify and liberalize U.S. international judicial
assistance procedures," and second to encourage other countries to
with a view to achieving improvements. To the end that procedures
necessary or incidental to the conduct and settlement of litigation in State
and Federal Courts and quasi-judicial agencies which involve the
performance of acts in foreign territory, such as the service of judicial
documents, the obtaining of evidence, and the proof of foreign law, may be
more readily ascertainable, efficient, economical, and expeditious, and that
the procedures of our State and Federal tribunals for the rendering of
assistance to foreign courts and quasi-judicial agencies be similarly
improved, the Commission shall-
(a) draft for the assistance of the Secretary of State international agreements
to be negotiated by him;
(b) draft and recommend to the President any necessary legislation;
(c) recommend to the President such other action as may appear advisable
to improve and codify international practice in civil, criminal, and
administrative proceedings; and
(d) perform such other related duties as the President may assign.
Act of September 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906, 72 Stat. 1743 (1958).
9. The Senate Report explains the need for having both government and bar
representatives cooperate in the study:
[T]he extensive increase in international, commercial and financial
transactions involving both individuals and governments and the resultant
disputes, leading sometimes to litigation, has pointedly demonstrated the
need and comprehensive study of the extent to which international judicial
assistance can be obtained. The study is of such magnitude that it cannot
readily be handled by some private body or law school institute. It should be
an integrated study with participation by representatives of the bar and of
the government.
S. Rep. No. 2392, (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5201.
For descriptions of the Commission's tasks, see Philip W. Amram, Public Law No.
88-619 of October 3, 1964-New Developments in International Judicial Assistance in
the United States of America, 32 D.C. BAR J. 24 (1965); Amy L. Conway, Note: In Re
Request For Judicial Assistance From the Federative Republic of Brazil: A Blow to
International Judicial Assistance, 41 CATH. U. L. REV 545, 555-556 (1992); and Hans
Smit, Recent Developments in International Litigation, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 215, 217-
219 (1994).
10. The 1964 amendments made four major changes: First, documentary and
tangible evidence was included as well as the taking of depositions and testimony.
Second, the word "court" was changed to "foreign or international tribunal." Third,
an "interested person" was allowed to request assistance as well as the tribunal itself.
Finally, the word "pending" was deleted. For a description of the changes made by
the 1964 amendments, see In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal
Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1153 (11th Cir. 1988).
11. The purpose was to "clarify and liberalize.., existing U.S. procedures for
[Vol. 29:3
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make similar adjustments. 12  Most recently, Section 1782(a) was
amended in 1996,13 in part to accommodate the needs of the
international tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
In the 1980s, a disagreement emerged among the circuit courts as
to the interpretation of Section 1782(a). The question was whether
Section 1782(a) implicitly required that evidence sought pursuant to
the statute be obtainable under foreign law in the foreign jurisdiction
if it were located there. As the foreign discoverability requirement
developed, its proponents put forward two major rationales in its
favor: First, not construing Section 1782(a) as including the
requirement would put Americans litigating abroad at a
disadvantage; if a foreign jurisdiction's rules place restrictions on
discovery, the American party will be confined by those rules in
obtaining discovery from the foreign party, whereas the foreign party
will have broad access to the American party's documents in the
United States under Section 1782(a). This rationale became known
as the "inter-party parity" rationale. Second, not construing the
statute as including the requirement would allow parties to
circumvent foreign law and procedures by granting discovery that the
foreign jurisdiction does not allow. This would put United States
courts in direct conflict with foreign tribunals and legislatures and
give offense to foreign sovereigns. This rationale was the
"international comity" rationale.
The idea that evidence must be discoverable in the jurisdiction
for which it is sought as a prerequisite to a judge's ordering its
discovery under Section 1782(a) was introduced in 1980. In In re
Court of Commissioner of Patents for the Republic of South Africa,14 a
South African company sought from the District Court of the Eastern
assisting foreign and international tribunals and litigants in obtaining oral and
documentary evidence in the United States." S. Rep. No. 1580, at 13 (1964), reprinted
in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3784.
12. "The Commission hopes that the initiative taken by the United States in
improving its procedures will invite foreign countries similarly to adjust their
procedures .... Enactment of the proposed bill should encourage foreign nations to
follow the example of the United States." Letter from Rep. Oscar Cox, Commission
on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, Chairman, to John McCormack,
Speaker of the House, (May 28, 1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3792, 3794.
13. The 1996 amendment specified that "foreign or international tribunal"
includes "criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation." Act of Feb 10,
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, §1342(b), 110 Stat. 486 (1996).
14. In re Court of Comm'r of Patents for Republic of South Africa, 88 F.R.D. 75
(E.D. Pa. 1980).
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District of Pennsylvania an order pursuant to Section 1782(a)
compelling a Pennsylvania corporation to produce documents and
testimony for use in a South African patent litigation. The court,
concerned that the applicant could not demonstrate that the evidence
sought was discoverable under South African law, stated that "[flew
actions could more significantly impede the development of
international cooperation among courts than if the courts of the
United States operated to give litigants in foreign cases processes of
law to which they were not entitled in the appropriate foreign
tribunals."15 The argument arose again before the same district court
three years later in John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp.,16 where the Court
denied a request for subpoenas duces tecum for use in a Canadian
patent infringement litigation, finding that to do otherwise would not
further reciprocity interests: Canadian law precluded use of letters
rogatory. The court stated that an order directing discovery "would
not enhance the reciprocity interests inherent in the statute, nor the
public policy considerations at stake.' 8 The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed this decision and granted the requested discovery,
holding that neither reciprocity nor admissibility were controlling
concerns under Section 1782(a).' 9 However, that court did express
concern over international comity, noting that a "grant of discovery
that trenched upon the clearly established procedures of a foreign
tribunal would not be within Section 1782."' 0 Although the Third
Circuit made clear in 1998 in In re Bayer AG2 that this comment had
signified no intent to impose a discoverability requirement,2 in the
intervening fifteen years, it was frequently cited in favor of imposing
the requirement. 3
15. Id. at 77.
16. John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 100 F.R.D. 712 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
17. Id. at 714.
18. Id.
19. John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1985).
20. Id.
21. In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 1998).
22. Id. at 192-193.
23. See, e.g. In re Letter Rogatory from the First Court of First Instance in Civil
Matters, Caracas, Venezuela, 42 F.3d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1995); In re Application of
Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1992); In re Letter of Request From Crown
Prosecution Service, 870 F.2d 686, 693 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858
F.2d 1564, 1565 (11th Cir. 1988); In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal
Affairs of Trinidad & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 1988); In re Application
for Order for Judicial Assistance in Foreign Proceeding in the High Court of Justice,
Chancery Division, England, 147 F.R.D. 223, 226 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
[Vol. 29:3
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In two 1988 cases, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals first
adopted and then affirmed the foreign discoverability requirement.
In In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs in
Trinidad and Tobago,24 it affirmed a decision by the District Court for
the Southern District of Florida granting the Ministry's request for a
subpoena requiring the appellant's bank to produce his records for
use in foreign criminal proceedings. Citing Court of Commissioner of
Patents, the court held that a district court must decide whether the
evidence sought would be discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction
before granting assistance, 25 but concluded that in the case at hand it
was so discoverable. 26 The Court reaffirmed this holding in Lo Ka
Chun v Lo To,27 where it vacated an order by the District Court for
the Southern District of Florida authorizing subpoenas duces tecum
against United States residents who were not parties to the foreign
action and remanded the case for a determination of whether the
evidence sought was discoverable under Hong Kong law. 28 The
Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed Trinidad and Tobago and its imposition
of the discoverability requirement in 2001 in United Kingdom v.
United States. 9 The Court held that the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida was within its discretion to deny
discovery so long as it had first performed the required inquiry into
foreign discoverability. °
In 1992, the First Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the
requirement in In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 3 where the
court reversed the decision by the District Court for the District of
Maine granting discovery to a group of European companies against
an American company over the latter's assertion that the information
sought would not be available and could not be used in the foreign
proceedings. The court held that not to impose a foreign
24. In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and
Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151 (11th Cir. 1988).
25. Id. at 1156.
26. Id.
27. Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1988).
28. Id.
29. United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2001).
30. "In deciding whether to respond to a request under § 1782, 'the district court
must decide whether the evidence would be discoverable in the foreign country
before granting assistance."' Id. at 1319 (quoting In re Request for Assistance from
Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir.
1988)).
31. In re Application of Asta Medica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992).
2006]
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discoverability requirement would contradict the purposes of Section
1782(a), both disadvantaging American parties to foreign litigation
and allowing parties to foreign proceedings to circumvent foreign
law.32
Also in 1992, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals expressed
disfavor with "extra-statutory restrictions" on Section 1782(a)
without explicitly rejecting the foreign discoverability requirement .
However, in 1993 in In Re Application of Adulante,' the Second
Circuit did make the rejection explicit. The court held that the text of
Section 1782(a) held no such requirement.35 Rather, district court
judges have the discretion not to grant discovery that the statute
authorizes, and concerns such as "intra-party parity" and
"international comity" are factors that they may consider in deciding
whether to exercise that discretion. 6 Following this strong statement
against the foreign discoverability requirement, the Second Circuit
continued to be its most staunch opponent during the ensuing
decade.37
In 1995, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a decision by
the District Court for the Northern District of Texas ordering
discovery for use in a Venezuelan labor dispute." In that case, the
party seeking assistance was a foreign sovereign, and the court held
that to examine requests by sovereigns for foreign discoverability was
unnecessary and would thwart efforts to foster international
cooperation.39  Thus, the requirement did not exist where the
requesting party was a foreign sovereign, but district courts in the
Fifth Circuit later came to conflicting decisions as to whether it
32. Id. at 14, 15.
33. "District courts issuing discovery orders pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 may
impose conditions to minimize the compliance burdens, so long as those conditions
do not impose extra-statutory barriers to obtaining discovery such as an exhaustion
requirement." In re Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 100 (2d
Cir. 1992).
34. In re Application of Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 1993).
35. Id. at 59
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Euromepa S.A. v. R. Esmeranian Inc., 51 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1995);
Esses v Hanania, 101 F.3d 873 (2d Cir. 1996); Euromepa, S.A. v. R. Esmerian, Inc.,
154 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 1998).
38. In re Letter Rogatory From First Court of First Instance in Civil Matters,
Caracas, Venezuela, 42 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1995).
39. Id. at 311.
[Vol. 29:3
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existed where the applicant was a private party.4°
In 1996, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals criticized the
requirement in United States v Morris,4 ' affirming the decision by the
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia ordering a
blood test for use in a German paternity action. The Court held that
for it to double-check the object of a foreign court's discovery request
for discoverability in that court would run contrary to the intent
behind Section 1782(a).42
In the Ninth Circuit, the District Court for the Central District of
California imposed the requirement in 1993 in In re Application for
Order for Judicial Assistance in Foreign Proceeding in the High Court
of Justice, Chancery Division, England, reversing the magistrate's
ordering of production of documents because the applicants were not
entitled to discovery beyond that available to them in the foreign
court.43 In 1994 in Okubo v. Reynolds, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals merely acknowledged the requirement's policy
implications.' It was not until Intel that the Ninth Circuit rejected the
requirement.45
In its opinion in Intel, the Supreme Court summarized the Circuit
split as follows:
40. In re Trygg-Hansa Ins. Co., 896 F. Supp. 624 (E.D. La. 1995) (imposing the
foreign discoverability requirement on private persons seeking assistance); In re
Time, Inc. 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15858 (E.D. La. 1999), In re Geert Duizendstraal,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16506 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 1997), and In re Sarrio S.A., 173
F.R.D. 190 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (finding no requirement).
41. United States v. Morris (In re Letter of Request from the Amtsgericht
Ingolstadt), 82 F.3d 590 (4th Cir. 1996).
42. Id. at 592.
43. In re Application for Order for Judicial Assistance in Foreign Proceeding in
the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, England, 147 F.R.D. 223, 226 (C.D.
Cal. 1993).
44. The court held:
Because the commissioners may have all the evidentiary materials appellants
seek, we need not decide the difficult questions whether the district court
can, as a matter of law, order the Tokyo District Prosecutor's Office to turn
over evidence, and whether equity would so require on the facts of this case.
We do note, however, that these questions raise serious concerns of
international comity, because by ordering the Tokyo District Prosecutor's
Office to turn over evidence ... we would risk sending a message of
disrespect for Japanese laws and procedures.
Okubo v. Reynolds (In re Letters Rogatory from the Tokyo Dist. Prosecutor's
Office), 16 F.3d 1016, 1021 (9th Cir. 1994) (footnotes omitted).
45. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d 664, 668-669 (9th Cir.
2002).
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The First and Eleventh Circuits have construed § 1782(a) to contain
a foreign discoverability requirement. The Fourth and Fifth
Circuits have held that no such requirement exists if the § 1782(a)
applicant is a foreign sovereign. In alignment with the Ninth
Circuit, the Second and Third Circuits have rejected a foreign
discoverability requirement.46
Such was the state of the law that the Court sought to resolve in Intel.
Intel v. Advanced Micro Devices
In October 2000, microprocessor producer Advanced Micro
Devices (AMD) filed a complaint with the Directorate General for
Competition of the European Commission (DG-Competition) against
Intel, its global competitor. Such a complaint is the first step under
European Communities law for the enforcement of the EC Treaty's
antitrust provisions. Under European Commission procedure, the
Commission acts through its DG-Competition to enforce European
competition laws and regulations. On receipt of a complaint (or sua
46. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2477, n.7 (citations omitted).
Other circuits have considered the issue without reaching a decisive conclusion and
so are excluded from this summary. The district court for the Northern District of
Illinois refused to impose the requirement (Elm Energy & Recycling v. Basic, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15255 (N.D. Ill. 1996)), and a lone dissenter argued for the
requirement in a Federal Circuit case that did not reach the issue (In re Jenoptik AG,
109 F.3d 721 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (Newman, dissenting)).
The D.C. Circuit held that commissioners appointed pursuant to Section 1782 to
obtain evidence for use by the UK Crown Prosecution Service were required to take
evidence in accordance with British procedure (In re Letter of Request From Crown
Prosecution Service, 870 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (R.B. Ginsburg)).
It is worth noting here that after the circuit split emerged, a critical near-consensus
developed that the foreign discoverability requirement was misguided. See, e.g. Brian
E. Bomstein & Julie M. Levitt, Much Ado About 1782: A Look at Recent Problems
With Discovery in the United States for Use in Foreign Litigation Under 28 U.S.C.
1782, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 429 (1989); Amy L. Conway, Note, In Re
Request For Judicial Assistance From the Federative Republic of Brazil: A Blow to
International Judicial Assistance, 41 CATH. U. L. REV 545 (1992); Gregory F. Hauser,
Section 1782 of Title 28 (U.S. Code): Is There a Discoverability Requirement?, 4 ILSA
J INT'L & COMP L 485 (1998); Peter Metis, International Judicial Assistance: Does 28
U.S.C. § 1782 Contain an Implicit Discoverability Requirement?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 332 (1994); Walker Sanzone, Extra-Statutory Discovery Requirements: Violating
the Twin Purposes of 28 U.S.C. Section 1782, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 117 (1996);
Steven M. Saraisky, How to Construe Section 1782: A Textual Prescription to Restore
the Judge's Discretion, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127 (1994); Hans Smit, American
Assistance to Litigation in Foreign and International Tribunals: Section 1782 of Title
28 of the U.S.C. Revisited, 25 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 1, (1998); Walter B.
Stahr, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. 1782 for Foreign and International Proceedings, 30
VA. J. INT'L L. 597 (1990).
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sponte), the DG-Competition conducts a preliminary investigation" in
which it may either seek information directly from the target or take
into account information provided by a complainant.' The result of
this preliminary investigation is a formal written decision whether or
not to pursue the complaint.4 9 If the DG-Competition declines to
proceed, that decision is subject to judicial review, first by the
European Court of First Instance and ultimately by the European
Court of Justice." If, on the other hand, the DG-Competition does
decide to pursue the complaint, it recommends that the Commission
find that the target has violated European competition law. 1 Upon
receipt of this recommendation, the European Commission may
47. The Treaty of Rome vests responsibility for enforcement of Articles 81 and
82 exclusively in the European Commission:
[T]he Commission shall ensure the application of the principles laid down in
Articles 81 and 82. On application by a Member State or on its own
initiative, and in cooperation with the competent authorities in the Member
States, who shall give it their assistance, the Commission shall investigate
cases of suspected infringement of these principles. If it finds that there has
been an infringement, it shall propose appropriate measures to bring it to an
end.
Treaty of Rome, Article 85. The Commission executes this authority through the
Directorate-General for Competition.
48. EC investigations can begin sua sponte or upon receipt of a complaint from
"any natural or legal person[] who claim[s] a legitimate interest" in the alleged
misconduct. Council Regulation 17/62 art. 3(2)(b), 1959-1962 O.J. Spec. Ed. 87.
49. See, e.g. the European Court of Justice's decision in the Stork Amsterdam
case:
The procedure for examining a complaint comprises three successive stages.
During the first stage, following the submission of the complaint, the
Commission collects the information which it needs to enable it to decide
how it will deal with the complaint. That stage may include an informal
exchange of views between the Commission and the complainant with a view
to clarifying the factual and legal issues with which the complaint is
concerned and to allowing the complainant an opportunity to expand on his
allegations in the light of any initial reaction from Commission officials.
During the second stage, the Commission may indicate, in a notification to
the complainant, the reasons why it does not propose to pursue the
complaint, in which case it must offer the complainant the opportunity to
submit any comments it may have within a time-limit which it fixes for that
purpose. In the third stage of the procedure, the Commission takes
cognisance of the observations submitted by the complainant. Although
Article 6 of Regulation No 99/63 does not expressly provide for the
possibility, this stage may end with a final decision.
Case T-241/97, Stork Amsterdam B.V. v. Comm'n of the European Communities,
2000 E.C.R. 309, 51 [hereinafter Stork Amsterdam].
50. Draft Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission
under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (effective May 1, 2004), 78.
51. Council Regulation 2842/98 arts. 10-14, 1998 O.J. (L 354) 18.
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either dismiss the complaint, or find infringement and impose
penalties. 2 This decision by the Commission is also subject to review
in the Court of First Instance and subsequently in the European
Court of Justice.53 The complainant in these proceedings lacks formal
"party" or "litigant" status,54 but may submit to the DG-Competition
information in suppolt of its allegations and may seek judicial review
of the Commission's disposition of its complaint.
As permitted under the law thus outlined, AMD recommended
that the DG-Competition seek documents that Intel had previously
produced in a private antitrust suit before the District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama.5 6 The DG-Competition declined this
recommendation. AMD then petitioned the District Court for the
Northern District of California for an order pursuant to Section
1782(a) directing Intel to produce the documents. The District Court
denied the application.57 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed that decision.58 The United States Supreme Court granted
59
Intel's petition for certiorari' "in view among the Circuits on the
question of whether § 1782(a) contains a foreign discoverability
requirement."'"
Perhaps aware that the foreign discoverability requirement faced
an uphill battle among the Justices, Intel put forth in its brief the
alternative formulation of the requirement that Section 1782(a)
52. Id. at 21.
53. Case C-282/95P, Guerin Automobiles v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. 1-1503, 5
C.M.L.R. 447, 481 (1997).
54. Id.
55. Council Regulation 17/62 art. 19(3), 1959-1962 O.J. Spec. Ed. 87: "[A]
complainant... ha[s] opportunities to present information in support of its
allegations." See also Stork Amsterdam, supra note 49.
56. Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (ND Ala. 1998).
57. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., No. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11511 (N.D. Ca 2002).
58. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 292 F.3d 664 (9th Cir. 2002).
59. Intel v. Advanced Micro Devices, 540 U.S. 1003 (2003).
60. Intel v. Advanced Micro Devices, 2002 WL 32509024 (U.S., Oct. 11, 2002),
cert. granted, 72 U.S.L.W. 3327 (U.S. Nov. 10, 2003) (No. 02-572).
61. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2476. The court also stated:
We also granted review on two other questions. First, does § 1782(a) make
discovery available to complainants, such as AMD, who do not have the
status of private "litigants" and are not sovereign agents? Second, must a
"proceeding" before a foreign "tribunal" be "pending" or at least
"imminent" for an applicant to invoke § 1782(a) successfully?"
Id. (citation omitted).
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assistance should be denied where the evidence sought would be
unavailable in the foreign jurisdiction and would also be unavailable
if the matter were being pursued in the United States.62 As such,
foreign discoverability became the first in a two-pronged test. Intel
argued that in the case at hand, European Communities law had not
permitted discovery of the documents, 63 and United States law would
preclude discovery in domestic litigation; AMD had brought the
complaint but was not itself directly suing Intel, and pre-litigation
discovery is generally unavailable to private entities under United
States law.64
The European Commission took the unusual step of filing an
amicus brief in support of Intel,6 asserting that neither it nor its DG-
Competition was a "tribunal." In support of this assertion, the
Commission put forth three arguments: that its investigations were
not an adjudicative process,66 that the comity-furthering intent behind
Section 1782(a) mitigates in favor of "tribunal" being construed
narrowly,67 and that deeming the Commission or its DG-Competition
a tribunal would put Commission law-enforcement programs in
jeopardy.'
62. Brief for Petitioner, Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 2003 WL
23138394 (U.S., Dec. 31, 2003) at 19-20.
63. "[I]t is undisputed that EC law would not permit AMD to obtain discovery of
these documents even if they were within the EC's jurisdiction rather than in the
United States." Id. at 19.
64. Intel argued:
[I]f AMD were pursuing this matter in the United States, U.S. law would
preclude it from obtaining discovery of Intel's documents, for the simple
reason that AMD has not filed suit against Intel and is not a litigant against
Intel in any relevant proceeding. With extremely narrow exceptions
inapplicable here, pre-litigation discovery is unavailable to private entities.
Id. at 19-20 (footnote omitted).
65. Brief of Amicus Curiae the Commission of the European Communities
Supporting Reversal, Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 2003 WL 23138389
(U.S., Dec. 23, 2003).
66. Id. at 8-9.
67. The Commission argued:
While the statute's present use of 'tribunal' encompasses a wider range of
entities than courts alone, Section 1782's deep roots in court-to-court
practice should not be disregarded. Rather, the statute should be construed
to be faithful to that purpose, by applying the term 'tribunal' solely to
adjudicative bodies and not to bodies, like the Commission, that are
entrusted principally with investigative rather than adjudicative functions.
Id. at 11.
68. Id. at 13-15.
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Regarding the foreign discoverability requirement, AMD put
forth two arguments in addition to the requirement's non-presence in
the text:69 first that the statute's history and purposes preclude such a
requirement, and second that Intel's policy arguments were meritless.
As to the former, AMD argued that it is widely recognized that
Section 1782(a) is driven by its "twin aims": providing liberal
discovery to those involved in tribunal proceedings in foreign
jurisdictions so as to encourage foreign jurisdictions to provide
American litigants equally liberal access to documents abroad.
Congress understood that those aims would be disserved by a rule
that allowed "a request for cooperation [to] turn into an unduly
expensive and time-consuming fight about foreign law."70 As to the
latter, AMD argued that they were better dealt with by district courts'
exercise of discretion than by strict categorical limitations on the
statute 71 and that Intel's arguments come down to typical complaints
about the breadth of U.S. discovery which were better directed at
Congress than at the courts.72
Justice Ginsburg wrote for a majority of six. 73 The Court rejected
Intel's argument that the only "interested persons" authorized to
apply for Section 1782(a) assistance were "litigants, foreign
69. Brief for Respondent, Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 2004 WL
297864 (U.S., Feb. 13, 2004) at 26-27.
70. Smit, Recent Developments, supra note 9, at 223.
71. AMD argued:
For instance, if a foreign party seeks discovery under § 1782 from a U.S.
litigant that the U.S. litigant could not obtain in the foreign party's home
jurisdiction, the U.S. district court can simply condition the assistance sought
by the foreign party on [the foreign party's] making available to the
American party [comparable discovery].
Brief for Respondent, supra note 69, at 31 (quoting Smit, Recent Developments, supra
note 9, at 237).
72. AMD argued:
[O]bjections to the fact that § 1782 does allow broader discovery where
appropriate are not properly directed at the courts, but at the Congress that
enacted the statute. It is particularly so here, inasmuch as Congress has
repeatedly demonstrated its ability and willingness to revise § 1782 to meet
changed circumstances. If the plain text of § 1782 now allows "too much"
discovery, Congress can and will revise that text. Until then, however, it is
the obligation of the courts to apply the statute as Congress has written it.
Id. at 33-34.
73. Justice Scalia wrote separately to assert that "it is... unnecessary to seek
repeated support in the words of a Senate Committee Report." Intel, 124 S. Ct. at
2484. Justice O'Connor took no part in the decision.
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sovereigns, and designated agents of those sovereigns."7 Rather, a
complainant such as AMD "possesses a reasonable interest in
obtaining [judicial] assistance," and therefore qualifies as an
"interested person" under the statute.
75
As to whether the information AMD sought was "for use in a
foreign or international tribunal," the Court held that the Court of
First Instance and the ECJ are indubitably tribunals.76 Because they
take no evidence, the only way AMD can "use" evidence in them is to
submit them at the preliminary, investigative stage.77 But in any case,
the EC is a quasi-judicial agency to the extent that it acts as a first
instance decisionmaker, and quasi-judicial agencies are included as
"tribunals" under Section 1782(a). 78 The Court also rejected Intel's
argument that the proceeding must be pending or at least imminent.
Congress deleted the word "pending" from the statute in 1964,7' and
there is nothing to suggest that the addition in 1996 of "criminal
investigations conducted before formal accusation" was meant to
limit preliminary discovery to criminal proceedings only.' Instead,
Section 1782(a) "requires only that a dispositive ruling ... be within
reasonable contemplation."8'
In dealing with the foreign discoverability requirement, the
Court noted that Section 1782(a) expressly shields privileged
material. Nothing else in the text limits district court judges'
production-order authority to materials discoverable abroad. What is
more, the legislative history does not suggest that Congress intended
to create a blanket foreign-discoverability rule . Instead, Congress
74. Id. at 2478.
75. Id.
76. "Beyond question the reviewing authorities, both the Court of First Instance




80. "Nothing suggests that this amendment was an endeavor to rein in, rather
than to confirm, by way of example, the broad range of discovery authorized in
1964." Id. at 2480.
81. Id.
82. In the court's words:
We note at the outset, and count it significant, that § 1782(a) expressly
shields privileged material: "A person may not be compelled to give his
testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing in violation
of any legally applicable privilege." Beyond shielding material safeguarded
by an applicable privilege, however, nothing in the text of § 1782 limits a
district court's production-order authority to materials that could be
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gave discretion to the district courts to issue appropriate orders, to
refuse orders, and to impose conditions they deem desirable. Intel's
policy concerns of avoiding offense and maintaining parity may be
touchstones for a district court's exercise of discretion, but they do
not permit insertion of a foreign discoverability requirement into the
text." The Court also rejected Intel's proposed two-pronged
formulation of the foreign discoverability requirement wherein
Section 1782(a) would not authorize discovery if that discovery would
be unavailable under foreign law and would also be unavailable in
analogous domestic litigation. "Section 1782... does not direct
United States courts to engage in comparative analysis to determine
whether analogous proceedings exist here .... For example, we have
in the United States no close analogue to the European Commission
regime under which AMD is not free to mount its own case in the
Court of First Instance or the European Court of Justice ....
Under the Court's opinion, the analysis of whether Section
1782(a) authorizes a grant of discovery is quite simple: discovery is
authorized so long as (i) the person from whom the discovery sought
resides in the district, (ii) a proceeding is pending before a foreign
tribunal, and (iii) the discovery sought is for use in that proceeding.
However, just because discovery is authorized does not mean that a
judge is required to grant it.85 Indeed, the statute gives district court
judges wide discretion in deciding whether to grant discovery. That
being the case, the Court expounded a four-factor balancing test for
judges to employ in exercising their discretion. The first factor to be
considered is whether the person from whom the discovery is sought
is a party to the foreign proceedings. If so, it militates against
granting discovery; foreign tribunals can themselves order parties to
produce evidence, whereas nonparticipants may be outside their
jurisdictional reach.86 The second factor is the nature of the foreign
proceedings and the receptivity of the foreign government, court, or
discovered in the foreign jurisdiction if the materials were located there.
Id. (citation omitted).
83. "While comity and parity concerns may be important as touchstones for a
district court's exercise of discretion in particular cases, they do not permit our
insertion of a generally applicable foreign-discoverability rule into the text of §
1782(a)." Id. at 2481.
84. Id. at 2482.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2483.
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agency to the judicial assistance.87 The third factor is whether the
request "conceals an attempt to circumvent [either] foreign proof
gathering restrictions or... policies of a foreign country or the
United States." 88 The fourth factor is whether the request is "unduly
intrusive or burdensome."8 9 The Court thus turned the decision of
whether a District Court judge should grant international judicial
assistance into a two-part inquiry: First whether assistance is
authorized by the statute, and second whether the judge should
exercise her discretion to grant it. The first part depends on whether
the facial requirements of the statute are met, and the second part
depends on the outcome of the four-factor balancing test.
Justice Breyer dissented. Believing that the majority's reading of
Section 1782(a)'s scope extends beyond what Congress might
reasonably have intended,' he suggests the adoption of two
categorical limits that would serve as the statute's outer bounds and
rule out discovery in instances where "it is virtually certain that
discovery (if considered case by case) would prove unjustified. '" 91
First, analogizing foreign tribunal-like bodies to American
administrative bodies,9 Justice Breyer would defer to these bodies'
self characterization, such that when "the applicability of the statute's
word 'tribunal' is in serious doubt, then a court should pay close
attention to the foreign entity's own view of its 'tribunal'-like or non-
'tribunal'-like status."93 Second, Justice Breyer accepted Intel's novel
formulation of the foreign discoverability requirement and put forth
the opinion that a district court should not be authorized to grant
discovery where it would not be permitted under foreign law and
where it "would not be available under domestic law in analogous
circumstances. '" 94 The problem with imposing these limitations is of
course that neither is present in the statute any more than was the
foreign discoverability requirement as previously formulated. Justice




90. Id. at 2485 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2485-2486.
92. "1 can think of no reason why Congress would have intended a court to pay
less attention to the foreign entity's view of the matter than courts ordinarily pay to a
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supervisory power over the management of litigation in the federal
judiciary to promulgate these categorical limitations.9
Limiting International Judicial Assistance
The necessity for placing some kind of limitation on the granting
of Section 1782(a) requests is undisputed. Also undisputed is that the
guiding principle for determining such limitation should be the "twin
aims" of clarifying and liberalizing U.S. international judicial
assistance procedures and encouraging other countries to do likewise.
The dispute between the majority and the dissent in Intel is about
what method of limiting assistance best achieves those aims. The
majority holds that discovery is broadly authorized under the statute,
but that this broad authorization is limited by judges' discretion upon
the balancing of four factors. Justice Breyer maintains that the Court
should use its supervisory authority over the federal courts to impose
two bright-line rules limiting the scope of the statute. There are
benefits and disadvantages to both positions.
Justice Breyer's proposed categorical limits on the scope of
Section 1782(a) have their attractions; such rules would, in keeping
with the first aim of the statute, clarify American international
judicial assistance procedures. They would lead to more predictable
results than the majority's balancing test and presumably cut back on
unnecessary litigation. However, it is not clear that Justice Breyer's
particular lines are the best ones to draw. First, Justice Breyer would
disallow discovery wherever a foreign tribunal-like body's status is in
doubt and that body characterizes itself as not being a tribunal. He
analogizes this deference to that given to American administrative
bodies under Chevron v. National Resource Defense Council.
96
However, the analogy is not entirely appropriate; the relationship
between United States courts and foreign courts is entirely different
from that between United States courts and United States agencies,
and so the rationales underlying the Chevron doctrine are absent.
More importantly, Justice Breyer's rule would run contrary to
the aims of encouraging other countries to liberalize their
international judicial assistance procedures. The European
Commission's amicus brief in support of Intel illustrates this problem.
For the Commission to claim as it did that the DG-Competition is not
95. Id. at 2488-2489.
96. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
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a tribunal, despite its clearly adjudicative role in the matter, gives all
appearances of disingenuousness. Professor Hans Smit, primary
draftsman of Section 1782(a), writes: "[T]o argue.., that it did not
qualify as a "tribunal," made no sense. There may well be
circumstances when, in a proceeding before the Commission,
information is needed that can be obtained in the United States only
by recourse to Section 1782. There appears to be no good reason for
precluding such recourse in all [Commission] proceedings ....97 The
Commission's claim seems to be a pretense to evade American-style
discovery. A rule such as that which Justice Breyer proposes would
open the door to similar claims by other foreign tribunals and
encourage them to shut themselves off from Section 1782(a)
assistance completely. In this sense, the majority's approach is
preferable: instead of requiring district court judges to consider
foreign tribunals' self-characterization, it has the judges take into
account the "receptivity of the foreign government" to the assistance.
A foreign tribunal may make it known that it does not want assistance
in a particular matter, and unless that statement is outweighed by the
other factors, the judge will comply with the tribunal's wishes.
Meanwhile, the foreign tribunal will still be able to receive assistance
in subsequent matters.
Justice Breyer's second proposed limitation is that discovery
should be disallowed where it is unavailable under the law of the
97. The complete quotation reads:
One may question the Commission's judgment in this respect. It was quite
appropriate for the Commission to inform the Supreme Court that it
preferred that the assistance be denied. [T]his will ordinarily suffice to
justify a denial of assistance in the court's discretion. But to argue, in the
teeth of the reality of its exercising adjudicatory authority, that it did not
qualify as a "tribunal," made no sense. There may well be circumstances
when, in a proceeding before the Commission, information is needed that
can be obtained in the United States only by recourse to Section 1782. There
appears to be no good reason for precluding such recourse in all proceedings
before the Commission, which is exactly what the Commission sought to
achieve. It may well be that, in a particular case, assistance by a United
States court would interfere with the way in which the Commission wants to
conduct its proceedings. In such a case, it can say so, and the United States
court will ordinarily desist. But taking the side of a party in the proceeding
on an issue on United States law would appear less appropriate. On that
issue, the Commission would have done better to defer to the Supreme
Court's interpretation of United States law.
Hans Smit, The Supreme Court Rules on the Proper Interpretation of Section 1782: Its
Potential Significance for International Arbitration, 14 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 295, 331-
332 (2004).
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foreign jurisdiction and in analogous domestic litigation. This rule is
appealing in that it provides a narrower, more focused limitation than
the foreign discoverability requirement as formulated in the First and
Eleventh Circuits and in that it would exclude assistance that would
probably "prove unjustified" 98 if considered on a base by case basis.
The primary objection to this limitation is put forward in the Court's
opinion: "[Section 1782(a)] does not direct United States courts to
engage in comparative analysis to determine whether analogous
proceedings exist here. Comparisons of that order can be fraught with
danger."'  Engaging in analysis of foreign law to determine
discoverability is a difficult job enough for district courts; requiring
that they also find domestic analogues to foreign proceedings and
determine discoverability in those analogues would only compound
the problem and would detract from whatever efficiency had been
gained by drawing the bright-line rule in the first place. Secondly, it is
not clear that this limitation furthers the aim of encouraging other
countries to liberalize their international judicial assistance
procedures. If even part of the rationale behind disallowing discovery
unavailable under foreign law is to avoid offending foreign
sovereigns, it seems that those sovereigns will still be offended if
district courts continue to grant discovery so long as it would be
available in analogous domestic proceedings.
The most promising aspect of Justice Breyer's dissent is his
proposal that even if no legal basis for imposing categorical
limitations can be found implicitly in Section 1782(a), the Court
should use its supervisory powers to propound such limits. Under the
Court's jurisprudence," ° it has the general power to supervise the
administration of justice in the federal courts and may use that power
to prescribe rules of procedure that are binding on those courts.1°1
Justice Breyer quotes Thomas v. Am for the proposition that the
supervisory powers "permit . . . 'procedures deemed desirable from
the viewpoint of sound judicial practice although in nowise
98. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2486.
99. The Court continues: "For example, we have in the United States no close
analogue to the European Commission regime under which AMD is not free to
mount its own case in the Court of First Instance or the European Court of Justice,
but can participate only as complainant, an "interested person," in Commission-
steered proceedings." Id. at 2482.
100. See Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Rd., 351 U.S.
115 (1956); Western Pac. R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R. Co., 345 U.S. 247 (1953).
101. Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
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commanded by statute or by the Constitution. ' ' ' 02 Clear rules in this
area may indeed be desirable from the viewpoint of sound judicial
practice. Nevertheless, the promulgation of supervisory rules is not
without its own considerations; under Dickerson v. U.S., the power to
judicially create and enforce rules not mandated by the Constitution
exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of Congress.03 Here,
there is an Act of Congress and that Act, in its use of the phrase "may
order" seems to give discretion to district court judges. In that sense,
a balancing test is better for the very reason that it is flexible, whereas
the categorical limitations proposed by Justice Breyer might be seen
as the Court trying to rewrite the statute.
In contrast with Justice Breyer's approach, the majority prefers
one wherein the foreign tribunal's receptivity to the assistance and
the potential for circumvention of foreign law are relegated as factors
that can be outbalanced by other factors in a judge's exercise of
discretion. This approach appears in keeping with the language of the
statute and the flexibility it seeks to give to district court judges in
granting Section 1782(a) requests. Also, it allows for experimentation
in the district courts and the gradual accretion of fact patterns and
results out of which a general rule may eventually emerge. On the
other hand, the balancing test is open to the typical criticisms that it is
subject to manipulation and likely to lead to disparate, unpredictable
results. Moreover, some may see it as not furthering the aim of
clarifying United States international judicial assistance procedures.
Additionally, even if we accept a balancing test as currently the better
approach, the particular list of factors that the Court expounds is not
completely satisfactory.
The Court's first factor, that the person from whom discovery is
sought being a party to the foreign proceeding militates against
granting the request, is appropriate. The history of Section 1782(a)
indicates that Congress was particularly concerned with giving
applicants access to information from non-parties. Also, this factor
helps resolve some of the concerns expressed in the inter-party parity
rationale; an American litigating abroad who is barred from obtaining
discovery from his or her foreign opponent will be at less of a
disadvantage because if the opponent makes a Section 1782(a)
102. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 146-147 (1985), quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414
U.S. 141,146 (1973).
103. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 437, quoting Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343,
353, n.11 (1959).
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request against him, the opponent will start with one count against
him in the balancing test. The Court's third factor, whether the
request conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign law, is also
appropriate; it helps resolve concerns expressed in the international
comity rationale; indeed, it does so better than the foreign
discoverability requirement or Justice Breyer's second proposed
limitation in that it goes directly to the issue of the applicant's
apparent motive in making the request.
The Court's second factor, "the nature of the foreign tribunal,
the character of the proceedings underway abroad, and the
receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad
to U.S. federal-court judicial assistance," is more difficult. While it is
appropriate that a judge take into account a foreign tribunal's
receptivity to assistance, and while this phrasing is preferable to
Justice Breyer's proposed deference to foreign bodies' self-
characterization, in order to avoid the problem illustrated by the
European Commission's amicus brief, it is important that the Court
make clear that a judge should not take a foreign body's self-
characterization as dispositive.
The Court should also be clearer as to its fourth factor, whether
the request is unduly intrusive or burdensome. Under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2), a district court judge always has authority
to limit discovery that is unreasonably cumulative, duplicative, or
unduly burdensome." The fourth factor should not be read as
overlapping that authority. Rather, it appears that foreign tribunals
and litigants are greatly concerned with the breadth of American
discovery and the potential for "fishing expeditions" that it creates.
This is expressed by the Commission in its argument that deeming it a
tribunal and thus subjecting it to evidence obtained in the United
104. Rule 26(b)(2) reads, in relevant part:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods otherwise
permitted under these rules and by any local rule shall be limited by the
court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking
discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the
information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the
amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in
resolving the issues.
FED. R. Cv. P. 26(b)(2).
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States would jeopardize its law enforcement programs.' °5 Therefore
in the interest of quieting such concerns and furthering the aim of
encouraging liberal discovery abroad, the unduly intrusive or
burdensome nature of a Section 1782(a) request should be factored
into the balancing test specifically to the extent that it reveals the
request to be part of a fishing expedition or the like.
Additionally, there are factors that might be relevant to a judge's
decision to exercise her discretion that are not included among the
four factors. For example, while the Court's first factor goes to the
resolution of concerns about intra-party parity, it does not do so
completely. The disadvantage to an American party in a foreign
action is lessened if the opponent seeking Section 1782(a) discovery
against him must somehow outbalance the Court's first factor.
However, that same American party will still be at a disadvantage if
he is unable to obtain discovery from third parties in the foreign
jurisdiction while the opponent is free to obtain third party discovery
in the United States without worrying about the first factor counting
against him. It may be that the Court consciously intended to exclude
this consideration from the balancing test; a decision by Congress to
liberalize international judicial assistance procedures is accompanied
by an awareness that the procedures of other jurisdictions are less
liberal. It is also accompanied by an acceptance of the current
discrepancies between them; the goal is that foreign procedures will
expand to match ours, not that our procedures will contract to match
theirs. In other words, in enacting Section 1782(a), Congress may
have made a decision to accept a certain degree of intra-party
disparity, and to try to equalize that disparity would no more
encourage foreign jurisdictions to liberalize their international
judicial assistance procedures than it would liberalize our own.
105. For example, the Commission argued that:
Of paramount importance are documents submitted to the Commission
under its Leniency Program by cartel participants who confess their own
wrongdoing. If the Commission were deemed a "tribunal" in the
competition context, it could find itself no longer able to guarantee the
confidentiality of those Leniency Program confessions by, inter alia, resort
to the law enforcement privilege wherever necessary. Companies make
delicate balancing judgments in deciding to come forward under the
Leniency Program, and any enhanced risk of public disclosure of their
confessions will deter their participation. Section 1782 as read by the Ninth
Circuit thereby threatens to undercut the effectiveness of the Commission's
Leniency Program.
Brief for Commission of the European Communities, supra note 65, at 15.
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Nevertheless, absent language to that effect from the Supreme Court,
district court judges may still want to consider this type of disparity
when engaging in the balancing test.
Conclusion
On the whole, the majority's approach is preferable to that of
Justice Breyer. It gives district court judges the flexibility imagined
by the statute, it takes into account most of the concerns expressed by
proponents of the foreign discoverability requirement, and it allows
district courts to respond to novel situations. However, its benefits
will be partly undone if district courts proceed by merely tallying up
the factors to see which direction most of them cut without
considering the twin aims. Courts should recognize the importance of
the twin aims and, taking the Court's list of factors as non-exhaustive,
feel free to take into account other potentially relevant factors.
Having said that, neither should the Supreme Court permanently
discard Justice Breyer's proposal of imposing clear-cut supervisory
rules. The Court itself indicated in dicta that it did not rule out such
an eventuality: "We decline, at this juncture, to adopt supervisory
rules. Any such endeavor at least should await further experience
with § 1782(a) applications in the lower courts." 1"6 A supervisory rule
will have the advantage of clarity, so long as it is based on the
experiences of the district courts and is in keeping with Section
1782(a)'s twin aims. Once a sufficient number of cases have arisen in
the district courts that the Supreme Court can determine which
factors best further the twin aims, it should incorporate those factors
into a supervisory rule.
106. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2483.
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